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PATENT LITIGATORS PLAYING COWBOYS AND 
INDIANS AT THE PTAB 
Michael E. Benson* 
INTRODUCTION 
The high-stakes nature of patent litigation emboldens patent litigators to 
implement unusual litigation strategies.  This Essay explores a novel application of 
tribal-sovereign-immunity protections to patent validity challenges in inter partes 
review (IPR) proceedings before the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO).  This Essay argues that the transfer of ownership of a patent to a 
federally recognized Native American tribe allows for the Native American tribe to 
assert its tribal sovereign immunity as a basis for avoiding IPR of the patent.  
Further, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), in declaring otherwise, 
overstepped its authority as an administrative agency and misconstrued relevant, 
binding precedent. 
Passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act
1
 (AIA) in 2011 introduced 
new avenues for parties to challenge the validity of patents granted by the 
USPTO.
2
  One of the newly introduced means for challenging patent validity is 
IPR.
3
  Through the IPR process, a party is able to bring a formal challenge as to the 





 before the PTAB.
6
  Statistically, infringement defendants (and other 
third parties) challenging patents through IPR have a much higher chance of 
succeeding on their invalidity challenge than defendants who assert invalidity as a 
defense before a judge or jury.
7
  From September 2012 to May 2017, only sixteen 
percent of the petitions that reached the final decision stage of the postinstitution 
 
 * Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2019; Bachelor of Science in 
Mathematical Physics, University at Buffalo, 2016.  I would like to thank Professor Stephen 
Yelderman for his guidance on this Essay and the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for 
their edits.  All errors are my own. 
 1 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 2 See generally id. 
 3 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2012). 
 4 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
 5 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
 6 See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). 
 7 See generally BRIAN C. HOWARD, LEX MACHINA: PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
(PTAB) 2017 REPORT (2017). 
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trials before the PTAB resulted in all of the petitioned claims being upheld, while 
sixty-nine percent of the petitions that reached the final decision stage resulted in 
all of the petitioned claims being invalidated.
8
 
Given the incredibly patent-unfriendly environment at the PTAB, it should 
come as no surprise that patent litigators fending off invalidity challenges sought 
ways to keep their contested patent claims from reaching the PTAB.  This Essay 
concerns a new frontier of crafty strategy to keep patents from review by the 
PTAB—the invocation of tribal sovereign immunity to prevent the PTAB from 
obtaining (subject-matter) jurisdiction over the patent invalidity dispute. 
Part I of this Essay provides background information about a current case in 
which the litigant has attempted to use tribal sovereign immunity in order to avoid 
an IPR proceeding before the PTAB.  Part II provides a brief summary of the 
current relevant law (tribal, patent, administrative, etc.) pertaining to tribal 
sovereign immunity in the context of patent invalidity disputes before the PTAB 
and applies that law to the general issue of using tribal sovereign immunity in 
order to avoid IPR proceedings.  Part III takes the pertinent law outlined in the 
previous section and addresses its specific application to the PTAB’s decision in 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe.
9
  The Essay ends with a 
brief conclusion. 
I.     BACKGROUND 
The litigation strategy uses a Native American tribe’s inherent tribal 
sovereign immunity in order to assert immunity from suit as a defense to the 
tribunal’s claim of jurisdiction over the case or adjudicative proceeding.  A patent 
owner transfers the title and all rights in the patent to a Native American tribe.  The 
Native American tribe then turns around and licenses the patent back to the 
previous patent owner.  Thus, the Native American tribe becomes the rightful 
owner of the patent while the previous patent owner is allowed to continue to 
exploit the patent under the license agreement.  Since the Native American tribe 
owns the patent, the tribe can assert its tribal sovereign immunity in order to avoid 
courtroom battles and administrative proceedings involving the patent.  In order for 
a suit to be brought against a sovereign party, the sovereign party must consent to 
be sued.
10
  If the sovereign party does not consent to the suit, a court (or 
administrative body) will lack jurisdiction over the proceeding and thus cannot 




 8 Id. at 3–4 (calculating percentages of outcomes from the data provided in the report 
concerning PTAB trials that reach the final decision stage). 
 9 See Mylan Pharm. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Nos. IPR2016-01127 to -01132 
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018). 
 10 See Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). 
 11 See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in 
nature.”). 
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A.   Sovereign Immunity 
Sovereign immunity exists in at least four contexts: (1) state sovereign 
immunity, (2) federal sovereign immunity, (3) foreign sovereign immunity, and (4) 
tribal sovereign immunity. 
Tribal sovereign immunity is the sovereign immunity retained by the 
federally recognized Native American tribes in the United States.  Tribal sovereign 
immunity blends many of the aspects of the other forms of sovereign immunity, 
but tribal sovereign immunity also has some distinctive features.  Unlike state 
sovereign immunity, tribal sovereign immunity can be restricted by treaty or 
through federal statute.
12
  Congress has plenary power over the Native American 
tribes and can alter tribal sovereign immunity simply by passing a bill.
13
  There is 
no commercial-activity exception to tribal sovereign immunity.
14
  Thus, in that 
respect, tribal sovereign immunity is stronger than foreign sovereign immunity.  
However, since Congress can unilaterally alter tribal sovereign immunity, tribal 
sovereign immunity is necessarily weaker than state sovereign immunity.  Though 
weaker, tribal sovereign immunity is more closely related and thus better 
analogized to state sovereign immunity as opposed to federal or foreign sovereign 
immunity. 
Despite the differences between the four above-enumerated types of 
sovereign immunity, the courts often analogize between the different types of 
sovereign immunity and generally keep the “rules” regarding the different 
sovereign immunities the same or similar. 
B.   Facts of the Instant Case 
The tribal-sovereign-immunity patent litigation strategy was first used in a 
case involving Allergan, maker of the popular dry eye medication Restasis, and 
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Teva 
Pharmaceuticals, and Akorn.
15
   
Allergan sued various generic-drug manufacturers for patent infringement.
16
  
Allergan asserted that the generic-drug manufacturers had infringed on the patent 
Allergan held on a popular dry-eye medication, Restasis.
17
  Once the generic-drug 
manufacturers had been sued, they responded by challenging the validity of 
Allergan’s Restasis patent through the IPR process before the PTAB (at the same 
 
 12 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978). 
 13 Id. at 56. 
 14 See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 789–90 (2014). 
 15 See Andrew Westney, Allergan Deal May Set Stage for More Tribal Patent Pacts, 
LAW360 (Sept. 14, 2017), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/4869c38a-391e-4d2b-a9ae-
069eeb7f1389/?context=1000516. 
 16 See Rachel Graf, Allergan Transfers Restasis Patents to IPR-Immune Tribe, LAW360 
(Sept. 8, 2017), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/d7ad5193-369d-4940-8906-
48b9beccb48c/?context=1000516. 
 17 Id. 
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time litigation was occurring in the Eastern District of Texas).
18
  The crafty 
lawyers at Allergan were looking for a way to avoid IPR proceedings at all costs; 
they settled on a novel approach—using tribal sovereign immunity to take away 
the PTAB’s jurisdiction in the case.
19
 
Thus, Allergan crafted a deal with the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, a federally 
recognized Native American tribe.
20
  Under the deal, “the patent titles were 
assigned to the St. Regis Mohawk tribe, with Allergan as the exclusive licensee.  
The tribe was paid $13.75 million . . . and was eligible to receive $15 million in 
annual royalties.  In exchange, [the tribe] promised not to waive sovereign 
immunity before the PTAB.”
21
  Based on the transfer and license back deal, 
Allergan asserted that the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe’s tribal sovereign immunity 
gave the tribe immunity from suit, thus protecting the Restasis patents from IPR by 
the PTAB.
22
  The tribe agreed to waive their tribal sovereign immunity specifically 
for the federal district court so that the district court litigation could continue, 




II.     CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW AS APPLIED TO THE ALLERGAN CASE 
This Part provides a brief overview of relevant caselaw from various fields of 
law implicated by the tribal-sovereign-immunity patent litigation strategy.  The 
Sections are organized in such a way that each Section builds upon the last, 
culminating in a setup for the question this Essay addresses: Is tribal sovereign 
immunity a defense available in PTAB proceedings? 
A.   Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
The portions of the long and storied history of tribal-sovereign-immunity 
jurisprudence that are relevant to the assertion of tribal sovereign immunity as a 
defense to suit can be concisely summed up by reference to two landmark Supreme 
Court cases. 
First, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
24
 the Court held that the members 
of the tribe had no cause of action to request declaratory and injunctive relief in 
federal court under the provisions of a particular act due to Congress not creating 
such causes of action under the act.
25
  In so holding, the Court stated, “Indian tribes 
have long been recognized as possessing the common-law immunity from suit 
 
 18 Id. 
 19 See Jenna Greene, Psst . . . Want to Buy Some Sovereign Immunity?, AM. LAW. (Oct. 18, 
2017), https://advance.lexis.com/api/permalink/1ca69025-a72a-4e69-8b80-
738850780882/?context=1000516. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
 25 Id. at 61–62. 
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traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.”
26
  Thus, the Court has repeatedly 
recognized the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity as providing Native 
American tribes immunity from suit—just as those with other forms of sovereign 
immunity (foreign, state, etc.) are immune from suit. 
Second, in Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. 
the tribe asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case on the basis of the 
tribe’s sovereign immunity from suit.
27
  The Supreme Court agreed with the tribe 
and held, “[a]s a matter of federal law, an Indian tribe is subject to suit only where 
Congress has authorized the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.”
28
  Here, the 
Court reaffirmed the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and provided only two 
scenarios under which a tribe loses it sovereign immunity—(1) where Congress 
has limited the tribe’s sovereign immunity and allowed for a party to sue the tribe 
and (2) where the tribe itself has waived its sovereign immunity and consented to 
suit. 
Importantly, the Supreme Court recognizes the doctrine of tribal sovereign 
immunity and, further, relates tribal sovereign immunity to other forms of 
sovereign immunity.  Additionally, the Supreme Court has only recognized two 
scenarios under which a tribe may not assert its tribal sovereign immunity, namely, 
when Congress waives the tribe’s sovereign immunity and when the tribe itself 
waives its own sovereign immunity. 
B.   Waiver of Tribal Immunity 
The Supreme Court has introduced additional restrictions on the scenarios 
under which a tribe may not assert tribal sovereign immunity, further narrowing 
the circumstances under which tribal sovereign immunity is waived. 
In United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., the Court held, 
“without congressional authorization” the “Indian Nations are exempt from suit.”
29
  
Thus, the Court took the position that, unless Congress has “authorized” the 
waiving of the tribal sovereign immunity, the tribe is immune from suit.  In other 
words, the default position is that the tribe is immune from suit unless Congress 
takes an affirmative step to waive the tribe’s sovereign immunity. 
In United States v. King, the Court addressed a question of the sovereign 
immunity of the United States.
30
  Though not directly a tribal-sovereign-immunity 
case, the principle of King should be informative since, under Santa Clara Pueblo 
v. Martinez, tribal sovereign immunity is just like any other kind of sovereign 
 
 26 Id. at 58; see also Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dept. of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977); 
United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940); Turner v. United States, 248 
U.S. 354, 358 (1919). 
 27 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). 
 28 Id. at 754; see also Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold 
Eng’g, P.C., 476 U.S. 877, 891 (1986); Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58; U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 
at 512. 
 29 U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 512. 
 30 United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969). 
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immunity.
31
  In King, the Court held that the waiver of sovereign immunity 
“cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.”
32
  Combining the 
holding of United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. and King provides the principle 
that tribal sovereign immunity must be expressly and unequivocally waived; a 
tribe’s sovereign immunity cannot be impliedly waived. 
Congress affirmed and further elaborated upon this principle in United States 
v. Wheeler.
33
  In Wheeler, the Court held that, “until Congress acts, the tribes retain 
their existing sovereign powers” and, accordingly, the court lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction over the tribe.
34
  Thus, for Congress to waive or abrogate tribal 
sovereign immunity, Congress must perform some kind of affirmative action 
expressly and unequivocally waiving the tribe’s sovereign immunity—such as 
passing a bill containing language to that effect.  If Congress does not follow the 
previously enumerated requirements for waiving tribal sovereign immunity, it is 
the default position that the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity applies to the 
suit. 
C.   The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act Does Not Waive Tribal Immunity 
Given that the tribal-sovereign-immunity jurisprudence requires that 
Congress expressly and unequivocally waive tribal sovereign immunity in order to 
abrogate a tribe’s right to assert sovereign immunity, it is appropriate to examine 
the statute that creates the IPR process to see if Congress anywhere expressly and 
unequivocally waived tribal sovereign immunity.  If Congress intended to waive a 
tribe’s right to assert its sovereign immunity in IPR proceedings, one would 
imagine that the express and unequivocal waiver would be found in the statutory 
language that created IPR.  However, nowhere in the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act do the words “tribe,” “sovereign,” or “immunity” appear.
35
  Congress 
has not expressly and unequivocally abrogated a tribe’s right to assert its sovereign 
immunity in an IPR proceeding. 
D.   No Constructive Waiver of Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
Despite the Court’s clear (and repeatedly asserted) stance that waivers of 
tribal sovereign immunity must be express and unequivocal, litigants have 
attempted to erode the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity by insisting that tribal 
sovereign immunity can be waived “constructively.” 
Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe
36
 involved a copyright issue.  Though 
the case is not directly on point, the various intellectual-property disciplines 
 
 31 See Martinez, 436 U.S. at 58. 
 32 King, 395 U.S. at 4; see also United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976). 
 33 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
 34 Id. at 323–24; see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Ferguson v. SMSC 
Gaming Enter., 475 F. Supp. 2d 929, 931 (D. Minn. 2007). 
 35 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 36 204 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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borrow from each other often enough that it is relevant to analyze how copyright 
law handles the same or similar issues faced in patent law.  There, the court held: 
     Applying Santa Clara Pueblo and Kiowa Tribe to this dispute convinces us 
that the Tribe is immune from suit on . . . copyright claims.  Nothing on the face 
of the Copyright Act . . . subject[s] tribes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
in civil actions . . . and a congressional abrogation of tribal immunity cannot be 
implied . . . . Kiowa Tribe makes clear that tribal immunity extends to these 
activities, and that a tribe does not waive its immunity merely by participating 
in them. . . . [T]he fact that a statute applies to Indian tribes does not mean that 
Congress abrogated tribal immunity in adopting it.
37
 
Importantly, the court recognizes that Congress must expressly waive tribal 
sovereign immunity and that simply participating in some congressionally 
regulated activity does not somehow constructively or impliedly waive a tribe’s 
right to assert sovereign immunity from suit.  But the court goes even further and 
boldly states that a statute does not abrogate a tribe’s sovereign immunity just 
because the statute applies to the tribe—there still exists the requirement that 
Congress expressly and unequivocally waive the tribal sovereign immunity. 
Like Bassett, Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of the University of Missouri
38
 is not 
directly on point.  Vas-Cath involves state sovereign immunity and discusses how 
state sovereign immunity interacts with the federal patent system.
39
  The Federal 
Circuit held, “[i]t is established that a state’s participation in the federal patent 
system does not of itself waive immunity in federal court with respect to patent 
infringement by the state.”
40
  It appears that the Federal Circuit in Vas-Cath 
applied the same principle expressed in Bassett—namely that mere participation in 
a congressionally regulated system (e.g., patent system) is not enough to find a 
waiver of sovereign immunity.
41
 
Further, the court in Vas-Cath foreshadowed potential problems with agency 
proceedings.  Citing to Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State 
Ports Authority,
42
 the court discussed an “analogy between some agency 
proceedings and civil litigation . . . to preserve the immunity of the non-consenting 
state in the agency proceeding.”
43
  The Federal Circuit’s decision in Xechem 
International, Inc. v. University of Texas M.D. Anderson Cancer Center stands for 
 
 37 Id. at 357 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fla. Paraplegic, 
Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe, 166 F.3d 1126, 1129–33 (11th Cir. 1999); Meyer v. Accredited 
Collection Agency Inc., No. 1:13CV444, 2016 WL 379742, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 29, 2016); J.L. 
Ward Assocs., Inc. v. Great Plains Tribal Chairmen’s Health Bd., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1178 
(D.S.D. 2012). 
 38 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 39 Id. at 1378–80. 
 40 Id. at 1381; see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that Congress did not do away with the states’ sovereign immunity 
with respect to patent infringement suits). 
 41 See also Biomedical Patent Mgmt. Corp. v. Cal., Dep’t of Health Servs., 505 F.3d 1328, 
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 42 535 U.S. 743 (2002). 
 43 Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1382. 
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largely the same proposition, again for state sovereign immunity.
44
  There, the 
court held, “the argument must be rejected that a state’s entry into the patent 
system is a constructive waiver of immunity for actions in federal court against the 
state under the patent law.”
45
 
Just as for federal and state sovereign immunity, there is no constructive (or 
implied) waiver of tribal sovereign immunity.  Tribal sovereign immunity must be 
expressly and unequivocally waived.  Further, participation in a statutorily 
regulated system does not constitute an express, unequivocal waiver.  Some kind 
of affirmative action must be taken for the tribe’s sovereign immunity to be 
waived. 
E.   No Commercial-Activity Exception to Tribal Immunity 
Though this Essay compares tribal sovereign immunity with the other forms 
of sovereign immunity, it is important to note that tribal sovereign immunity 
differs from foreign sovereign immunity in at least one noteworthy way—namely, 
there is no commercial-activity exception that applies to tribal sovereign immunity. 
In Intel Corp. v. Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research 
Organisation, the Federal Circuit held that Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial 
Research Organisation “is not entitled to claim immunity under the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (‘FSIA’), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611, because the 
‘commercial activity’ exception applies.”
46
  As explained by the Federal Circuit, 
there is a statute (the FSIA) that expressly waives foreign sovereign immunity 
when foreign sovereigns participate in “commercial activity.”
47
  That statute is an 
example of Congress expressly and unequivocally waiving sovereign immunity for 
a particular group. 
No such commercial-activity exception exists for tribal sovereign immunity.  
This principle was unambiguously announced in Home Bingo Network v. 
Multimedia Games, Inc.
48
  In Home Bingo, the court held that “absent waiver, the 
[tribe] is entitled to immunity.  This is true regardless of whether the [tribe] may 
have been engaging in activity off the reservation or whether the activity is 
commercial in nature.”
49
  The court explained that, unlike for foreign sovereign 
immunity, there is no commercial-activity exception that waives tribal sovereign 
immunity. 
 
 44 382 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 45 Id. at 1331; see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999). 
 46 455 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 47 Id. at 1369 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2006)). 
 48 Home Bingo Network v. Multimedia Games, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-0608, 2005 WL 
2098056, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005). 
 49 Id. at *1; see also Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 
498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991); Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 357 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
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Since there is no commercial-activity exception for tribal sovereign 
immunity, tribal sovereign immunity should be understood to be “stronger” than 
foreign sovereign immunity—at least in the commercial aspect of the immunity. 
F.   Sovereign Immunity Is Available in Patent Infringement Actions 
It is clear that tribal sovereign immunity cannot be waived simply by 
participating in a statutorily regulated system.  However, sovereign-immunity 
jurisprudence further specifies that sovereign immunity is available (and has 
successfully been used) in patent infringement actions. 
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College 
Savings Bank, the Court was dealing with the Patent and Plant Variety Protection 
Remedy Clarification Act (“Patent Remedy Act”).
50
  Through the Patent Remedy 
Act, Congress amended the patent laws—expressly abrogating states’ sovereign 
immunity in patent infringement suits.
51
  Specifically, the Court dealt with “state 
infringement of patents and the use of sovereign immunity to deny patent owners 
compensation for the invasion of their patent rights.”
52
  Congress sought to remedy 
this violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing the states from asserting 
sovereign immunity in patent infringement suits.
53
  The Court held that although 
the language in the statute was clear (express and unambiguous), Congress does 
not have the power to give such a statute the force of law following the Court’s 
decision in Seminole Tribe.
54
  Similarly, in other cases, the court has found that 
sovereign immunity applies to patent infringement actions.
55
 
A key difference to be noted here: Native American tribes do not enjoy the 
same kinds of constitutional protections afforded to the states.  Had the Patent 
Remedy Act been targeting tribal sovereign immunity and not state sovereign 
immunity, the statute would (very likely) not have run into the same kinds of 
problems.  That being said, the above-noted cases are presented simply to clearly 
illustrate the point that sovereign immunity is available as a litigation technique 
and has been used successfully in patent infringement litigation in the past. 
G.   Sovereign Immunity Is Available in Administrative Proceedings 
Decades of sovereign-immunity jurisprudence establishes that sovereign 
immunity can be asserted to provide immunity from a suit brought before a court 
(or some other judicial tribunal).  However, can sovereign immunity be asserted 
for the same effect in cases involving adjudication before administrative agencies?  
 
 50 See 527 U.S. 627, 630–31 (1999). 
 51 Id. at 630. 
 52 Id. at 640. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See id. at 647–48.  See generally Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S 44 (1996). 
 55 See Xechem Int’l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (holding that immunity applies to 35 U.S.C. § 256 action); see also Tegic Commc’ns 
Corp. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Tex. Sys., 458 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir.  2006) (holding that 
immunity applies to diversity-jurisdiction action raising Title 35 challenges). 
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The Supreme Court decision in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina 
State Ports Authority answered that question in the affirmative.
56
 
In Federal Maritime Commission, Maritime Services filed a complaint with 
an administrative agency, the Federal Maritime Commission, asserting that South 
Carolina State Ports Authority, an arm of the State of South Carolina, had violated 
a statute that the Federal Maritime Commission was charged with enforcing.
57
  
Through adjudicatory proceedings, the Federal Maritime Commission held that 
South Carolina State Ports Authority’s state sovereign immunity applied only to 
proceedings before judicial tribunals (i.e., courts) and did not apply to adjudicatory 
proceedings before executive agencies.
58




The Supreme Court noted that neither the United States nor the Federal 
Maritime Commission disputed the Fourth Circuit’s assertion that administrative 
adjudication “walks, talks, and squawks like a lawsuit” and thus held that the 
adjudication should be treated as such when deciding if state sovereign immunity 
immunizes the South Carolina State Ports Authority from suit.
60
  Further, the Court 
held that “[g]iven . . . the strong similarities between [administrative] proceedings 
and civil litigation, . . . state sovereign immunity bars [an agency] from 
adjudicating complaints filed by a private party against a nonconsenting State.”
61
  
Thus, so long as the administrative agency’s adjudicatory proceedings are similar 
enough to suits heard in actual judicial tribunals—state sovereign immunity 
applies. 
The case provides no direct guidance on two important questions: (1) Can 
state sovereign immunity apply specifically to adjudicative proceedings before the 
PTAB?  And, (2) if state sovereign immunity applies to adjudicative proceedings 
before the PTAB, does tribal sovereign immunity apply to adjudicative 
proceedings before the PTAB?  Though unanswered by Federal Maritime 
Commission, the Supreme Court’s holding in the case certainly provides highly 
persuasive precedent pointing to affirmative answers to both questions. 
H.   Sovereign Immunity Is Available in PTAB Proceedings 
Following the Supreme Court’s clear guidance in Federal Maritime 
Commission, it appears that the PTAB (reluctantly) agrees that state sovereign 
immunity (under the Eleventh Amendment) is applicable to IPR cases before the 
PTAB.  However, the PTAB introduces one (huge) caveat—waiver. 
In Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of the University of Minnesota, the PTAB 
reiterated that state sovereign immunity (under the Eleventh Amendment) is 
 
 56 535 U.S. 743, 750–51 (2002). 
 57 See id. at 747–48. 
 58 Id. at 747. 
 59 Id. at 747–48. 
 60 Id. at 751, 757, 760. 
 61 Id. at 760. 
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available as a defense in IPR cases.
62
  Specifically the Board stated, “[t]he Board 
has previously determined that Eleventh Amendment immunity is available to 
States as a defense in an inter partes review proceeding.”
63
  Thus it is clear that the 
PTAB, in general, recognizes (and has recognized in the past) that a patent owner 
may assert state sovereign immunity as a defense in IPR proceedings.  If the PTAB 
has in the past recognized that state sovereign immunity is applicable in IPR cases, 
then how can the PTAB claim that tribal sovereign immunity is inapplicable in IPR 
proceedings?  It is inconsistent to allow state sovereign immunity as a defense in 
IPR proceedings but not allow tribal sovereign immunity as a defense. 
Further, in Ericsson, the Board stated, “[i]n keeping with Vas-Cath, we 
determine that inter partes reviews, like interferences, are similar to court 
proceedings . . . . [The] Patent Owner, therefore, is entitled to rely on its Eleventh 
Amendment immunity in inter partes reviews.”
64
  Not only did the Board agree 
that state sovereign immunity is an applicable defense in IPR proceedings, but the 
Board stated that the reason state sovereign immunity is an applicable defense in 
IPR proceedings is because IPR proceedings are similar to civil litigation—
echoing the sentiment stated in Federal Maritime Commission. 
Despite finding that state sovereign immunity is a generally applicable 
defense in IPR cases before the PTAB, the Board in Ericsson found that the 
University of Minnesota had waived its state-sovereign-immunity defense by filing 
an infringement action in federal court.
65
  The Board stated, “it is reasonable to 
view a State that files a patent infringement action as having consented to an inter 
partes review of the asserted patent.”
66
  There, the Board was either acting in spite 
of or in willful blindness to Supreme Court precedent.
67
  Participation in the 
federal patent system does not amount to a waiver of sovereign immunity.
68
 
The PTAB has established that sovereign immunity is a defense that is 
available in PTAB proceedings, but (incorrectly) subject to waiver.  However, the 
PTAB has not squarely addressed the question of whether tribal sovereign 
immunity, specifically, is a defense available in PTAB proceedings. 
III.     DECONSTRUCTING THE PTAB’S DECISION IN THE ALLERGAN CASE 
Despite the overwhelming precedent detailed above, the PTAB disagrees that 
tribal sovereign immunity is an available defense in IPR proceedings.  Specifically, 
in Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe,
69
 the PTAB held, 
 
 62 See Ericsson Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Minn., Nos. IPR2017-01186, -01197, -01200, -
01213, -01214, -01219, 2017 WL 6517563, at *2 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 19, 2017). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at *3. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See supra Sections II.B, II.D. 
 68 See Xechem Int’l., Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324, 
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999). 
 69 Nos. IPR2016-01127 to -01132 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018). 
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inter alia, that tribal sovereign immunity did not apply as a defense in the case and 
thus denied the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe’s motion to terminate the 
adjudication.
70
  The decision the PTAB reached cannot be correct.  Below, each of 
the theories that the PTAB set forth supporting their decision to find in favor of 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals are addressed and countered. 
In Mylan Pharmaceuticals, the PTAB rested their decision on arguments that 
can broadly be sorted into two categories.  First, the PTAB found that the Saint 
Regis Mohawk Tribe did not establish that tribal sovereign immunity should apply 
to the PTAB proceedings.
71
  This line of argumentation will be referred to as the 
“no precedent” argument.  Second, the PTAB found, independent and regardless of 
their no precedent argument, that the case before the PTAB could continue (i.e., 
the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe’s motion to terminate should be denied) because 
Allergan “retained ownership” of the patents in dispute.
72
  This line of 
argumentation will be referred to as the “not an indispensable party” argument.  
Though the PTAB presents two different arguments for why the Saint Regis 
Mohawk Tribe’s motion to terminate was denied,
73
 neither of the justifications 
hold up under scrutiny.  Additionally, the PTAB’s decision creates a fundamental 
separation of powers issue. 
A.   Addressing the PTAB’s “No Precedent” Argument 
The PTAB denied the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe’s motion to terminate 
utilizing a “no precedent” argument.
74
  The PTAB criticized the Saint Regis 
Mohawk Tribe’s reliance on Federal Maritime Commission.
75
  The PTAB stated, 
“[t]he Tribe and its supporting amici . . . have not pointed to any federal court or 
Board precedent suggesting that [Federal Maritime Commission’s] holding with 
respect to state sovereign immunity can or should be extended to an assertion of 
tribal immunity in similar federal administrative proceedings.”
76
  In essence, the 
PTAB argued that Federal Maritime Commission was not applicable precedent 
here because that case specifically involved state sovereign immunity as a defense 
at an adjudicatory proceeding before an administrative agency, while the instant 
case involved tribal sovereign immunity and a different administrative agency.  
The PTAB is attempting to (very) narrowly interpret Federal Maritime 
Commission in order to avoid having to abide by the precedent the case set.  The 
position taken by the PTAB is untenable. 
First, time and time again the Supreme Court has looked to cases involving 
other types of sovereign immunity (e.g., state sovereign immunity) for guidance 
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when deciding cases involving tribal sovereign immunity.
77
  Important precedent 
should not be summarily dismissed simply because the case involves a different 
type of sovereign-immunity defense.  How the Court has previously dealt with a 
similar issue involving sovereign immunity should be given substantial weight, 
regardless of the type of sovereign immunity involved.  The PTAB’s strategic use 
of Kiowa fails to rebut this proposition.
78
  While Kiowa does draw a distinction 
between tribal and state sovereign immunity,
79
 the Board’s focus on the 
immunities not being coextensive misses the mark completely. 
The point is not that tribal sovereign immunity and state sovereign immunity 
are the same (or coextensive) and thus should be treated in exactly the same way.  
The point is that tribal sovereign immunity and state sovereign immunity are 
similar and should be treated in similar ways.  Further, the portion of Kiowa cited 
by the PTAB is dicta taken completely out of context.  The portion of the Kiowa 
decision the PTAB cites to answers the question of whether Native American 
tribes are subject to state laws for off-reservation activity and has almost nothing to 
do with the primacy of one form of sovereign immunity over another.
80
 
Second, which particular administrative agency a tribe is before when 
asserting its tribal-sovereign-immunity defense matters only to the extent that a 
statute may have explicitly waived the use of tribal sovereign immunity as a 
defense.  If a statute (e.g., an agency’s organic statute) has not explicitly waived a 
tribe’s sovereign-immunity defense for adjudicative proceedings before a 
particular agency, then the tribe is free to assert its sovereign immunity.
81
  
Additionally, in their explanation, the PTAB is approaching tribal sovereign 
immunity exactly backwards.  The presumption is not that tribal sovereign 
immunity does not apply unless a party can present precedent showing that tribal 
sovereign immunity should apply.  The presumption is that tribal sovereign 
immunity does apply unless Congress or the tribe explicitly and unambiguously 
waives the right to a tribal-sovereign-immunity defense.
82
 
In asking the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe or the amici to provide a case 
directly on point to the issue before the PTAB, the PTAB is (intentionally or 
unintentionally) making a request that is impossible to satisfy.  The issue is one of 
first impression before the PTAB, so logically it follows that no case directly on 
point to the exact issue would exist.  Since it is painfully clear from the Supreme 
Court precedent that a tribe’s sovereign-immunity defense is applicable unless 
Congress or the tribe says that it is not,
83
 the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show 
why such an immunity defense does not apply in this situation: Is there any 
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precedent that the plaintiffs or the PTAB can point to in support of the position that 
a tribal-sovereign-immunity defense is not a defense available to a Native 
American tribal defendant in federal agency adjudication when the tribe has not 
waived the defense? 
Upon close scrutiny, the PTAB’s “no precedent” argument does not hold 
water. 
B.   Addressing the “Not an Indispensable Party” Argument 
The PTAB also denied the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe’s motion to terminate 
utilizing a “not an indispensable party” argument.
84
  This argument comes in two 
parts.  First, the PTAB argued that the identity of the patent owner does not matter 
in IPR adjudications because the adjudication is simply about the validity of patent 
claims.
85
  Second, the PTAB argued that Allergan still “owns” the patents in 
dispute and thus the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe’s assertion of their tribal sovereign 
immunity is immaterial.
86
  Again, the positions taken by the PTAB are untenable. 
First, the PTAB’s conclusion that ownership of the patent does not matter in 
an IPR proceeding must be false.
87
  How can the identity of the patent owner not 
matter in an IPR proceeding?  The “inter partes” portion of “inter partes review” 
literally translates to “between parties.”
88
  If the proceeding is “between parties,” 
how can the identity of one of the parties not matter?  If the identity of the patent 
owner does not matter and the patent owner is not an important party in the 
proceeding, do we need the patent owner’s interests to be represented at all in an 
inter partes review proceeding? 
Could the PTAB just hold a postgrant reexamination of a patent without any 
input from the patent owner?  With this decision, the PTAB is creating a dangerous 
precedent for letting one party “litigate” a dispute in an administrative agency 
adjudicatory proceeding without giving the party who may be deprived of their 
property right a chance to fight back.  In other words, the PTAB is quickly 
descending into Fifth Amendment takings territory.  Simply put, this “support” for 
the PTAB’s denial of the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe’s motion to terminate is an 
exercise in shoddy reasoning. 
Additionally, nowhere in Chapter 31 of Title 35 of the United States Code
89
 
does the statutory language, which lays the ground rules for IPR proceedings, 
allow for a proceeding to begin with only one of the two parties.  Intriguingly, 
Chapter 31 is littered with references to the “patent owner.”  For example, see 
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§ 312(a)(2).
90
  More importantly, see § 312(a)(5), which reads, “provide[] copies 
of any of the documents required . . . to the patent owner.”
91
  It would be very odd 
to assert that the patent owner is not a necessary party to an IPR proceeding when 
the portions of the Code concerning IPR proceedings include frequent reference to 
a “patent owner.”  That kind of statutory interpretation would render § 312(a)(5) 
superfluous, which, of course, is to be avoided under the canons of statutory 
construction.
92
  Furthermore, the PTAB’s assertion that the patent owner is not a 
necessary party to an IPR proceeding would render, inter alia, the following 
















Second, the PTAB’s assertion that Allergan still “owns” the patents in 
dispute must be false.  The Board wrote, “[b]ased on the terms of the License 
between Allergan and the [Saint Regis Mohawk] Tribe, we determine that the 
License transferred ‘all substantial rights’ in the challenged patents back to 
Allergan.”
100
  The PTAB went even further and asserted that even if the tribe is an 
indispensable party, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which guide the PTAB, 
do not require joinder of indispensable parties.
101
  On this basis, the PTAB 
completely sidestepped the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe’s assertion of tribal 
sovereign immunity, finding that Allergan is still the true owner of the patents and 




Foremost, it is not the province of an administrative agency taxed with 
determining the validity of patent claims to inquire into whether a particular 
patent-licensing deal is up to snuff.  That is simply outside the scope of the 
agency’s powers as delegated by Congress.  In general, the USPTO has two 
responsibilities: (1) “granting and issuing of patents and the registration of 
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trademarks” and (2) “disseminating to the public information with respect to 
patents and trademarks.”
103
  In acting as an arbiter to decide whether a “transfer 
and license back” deal is valid, the PTAB has encroached on the judiciary’s power.  
Here, the PTAB is exercising power that it does not have.  If there are questions 
concerning the legitimacy of the deal between Allergan and the Saint Regis 
Mohawk Tribe, those questions should be addressed before an Article III judge. 
Furthermore, the kind of bargain that the PTAB is challenging, transfer and 
license back, is not unusual.  In fact, intellectual property holding companies that 
are subsidiaries of larger corporations make frequent use of transfer and license 
back deals.  Without such deals, intellectual property holding companies would 
serve no useful purpose for the parent company.  Additionally, these deals have 
been upheld in other areas of intellectual property law (e.g., trademark law).
104
  
Even if an Article III judge agreed with the PTAB’s holding that the license and 
transfer back deal between Allergan and the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe was a 
“sham” because the Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe transferred all substantial rights 
back to Allergan, that does not change the fact that the PTAB incorrectly 
interpreted and applied tribal law to the question of whether tribal sovereign 
immunity is an available defense in IPR proceedings.  If an Article III judge agrees 
that, because of the structure of the specific transaction, tribal sovereign immunity 
is not an applicable defense in this particular case, that ruling should not be 
interpreted to mean that tribal sovereign immunity is never an available defense in 
an IPR proceeding. 
Upon close scrutiny, the PTAB’s “not an indispensable party” argument does 
not hold water. 
C.   Unnecessary Separation of Powers Issue Created  
The PTAB, in issuing its decision in Mylan Pharmaceuticals, has 
unintentionally created a separation of powers issue.  In Bay Mills,
105
 the Supreme 
Court found, “it is fundamentally Congress’s job, not [the Court’s], to determine 
whether or how to limit tribal immunity.”
106
  As Professor Greg Ablavsky wrote, 
“[a]stonishingly, the PTAB’s decision never discusses the facts, holding, or 
reasoning of Bay Mills.”
107
  If it is solely Congress’s job to decide how and where 
tribal sovereign immunity applies, and Congress has not delegated that authority to 
decide to the USPTO, then it follows that the USPTO cannot decide issues relating 
to tribal sovereign immunity.  In deciding when to apply tribal sovereign immunity 
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in Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, the USPTO has 
overreached and usurped Congress’s power.  The APJs, acting as an arm of the 
Executive, have adjudicated an issue that clearly falls outside of their 
“administrative jurisdiction.”  Here, it is necessary for the courts to step in and 
enforce this power boundary. 
CONCLUSION 
What started with an unusual (and brilliant) patent litigation strategy in a 
high-stakes patent infringement suit has quickly developed into a legal quagmire.  
Whether due to unfamiliarity in the field of tribal law or ignorance of Supreme 
Court precedent, it appears that the PTAB’s decision in Mylan Pharmaceuticals is 
incorrect.  The PTAB’s broad conclusion that tribal sovereign immunity can never 
be used as a shield against IPR proceedings blatantly contradicts Supreme Court 
precedent. 
This Essay has argued that the transfer of ownership of a patent to a federally 
recognized Native American tribe does allow for the Native American tribe to 
assert its tribal sovereign immunity as a basis for avoiding inter partes review of 
the patent.  Further, this Essay took a strong stance that PTAB, in declaring that 
tribal sovereign immunity is not applicable to inter partes review proceedings in 
Mylan Pharmaceuticals, overstepped its limited authority as an administrative 
agency and misconstrued relevant precedent. 
